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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Commercial Free Speech and the
Twenty-First Amendment - Lamar Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 539 F. Supp. 817
(S.D. Miss. 1982).
INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the power granted to the states by the twenty-first
amendment,' the possession and sale of alcoholic beverages were
banned in Mississippi2 until 1966 when the state enacted the Local
Option Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.' The state, while re-
affirming its policy in favor of prohibition and redeclaring it as
the law of the state,' then allowed counties to vote themselves
"out from under the prohibition law" that would otherwise be en-
forced.' The majority of the state's population resides in "wet"
I. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or Posses-
sion of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is thereby prohibited." See Comment, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising And The First Amendment, 52 U. CtN.
L. REV. 861 (1983).
2. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-31-5 (1972).
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, to sell, barter, or give away,
or keep for such purposes any sweet spirits of nitre, liquid ginger preparation, elixir of orange peel,
pear extract, or any like drug, compound, bitters, elixir or preparation of any kind whatsoever, except
where otherwise legalized under the laws of this state, which when drunk to excess, it, the form sold,
will produce intoxication, except when the same is kept, sold, bartered or given away for either medic-
inal, or household purposes, or for uses in cooking, baking, and purposes incidental to the treatment
of disease.
Until 1966, this was the only law in Mississippi concerning the control of alcoholic beverages.
3. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-1 to -97 (1972 & Supp. 1984). Section 67-1-7 states:
[Tihe manufacture, sale, distribution, possession and transportation of alcoholic beverages shall be
lawful in those counties in which, at a local option election held for that purpose, a majority of the
qualified electors voting in the election shall vote in favor thereof. However, the manufacture, sale
and distribution of such alcoholic beverages shall not be permissible in such counties except in (a)
incorporated municipalities located within such counties, (b) qualified resort areas within such coun-
ties approved as such by the state tax commission, or (c) clubs within such counties, whether within
a municipality or not.
Section 67-1-7 makes lawful the manufacture, sale, distribution and possession of native wines in any loca-
tion within any such county except those locations where such is prohibited by law other than by 67-1-7 or
by regulations of the commission. Id.
4. Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-3 (1972), which states:
The policy of this state is reannounced in favor of prohibition of the manufacture, sale, distribution,
possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor, and the provisions against such manufacture, sale,
distribution, possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor, as contained in Chapter 31 of Title
97, Mississippi Cede of 1972 and else where, are hereby redeclared the law of this state.
5. MIss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-3 (1972), which states:
The purpose and intent of this chapter is to vigorously enforce the prohibition laws throughout the
state, except in those counties voting themselves out from under the prohibition law in accordance
with the provisions of this chapter, and, in those counties, to require strict regulation and supervision
of the manufacture, sale, distribution, possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor under a sys-
tem of state licensing of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, which licenses shall be subject to
revocation for violations of this chapter.
All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this chapter are repealed only to the extent of such con-
flict; however, except as is provided in this chapter, all laws prohibiting the manufacture, sale, distri-
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counties. At the time of this writing, 33 of Mississippi's 82 coun-
ties are "dry" and 45 are "wet". Four other counties, Chickasaw,
Hinds, Jasper and Jones, each have one dry judicial district.6
Mississippi is one of several states7 which has significant
restrictions' on liquor advertising originating from within the state.
In asserting the statutory authority granted to the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Division of the Mississippi State Tax Commis-
sion to "issue rules prohibiting the advertising of alcoholic
beverages in the state in any class of media," 9 Regulation No.
610 was issued which prohibits most such advertisements that
bution and possession of alcoholic beverages, which are not in conflict with this chapter shall remain
in full force and effect, and all such laws shall remain in full force and effect in counties wherein
the manufacture, sale, distribution and possession of alcoholic beverages has not been authorized as
a result of an election held under § 67- 1 -11.
6. Telephone interview with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the Mississippi State Tax Com-
mission (April 15, 1984).
7. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.42 (10)-(12) (West Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (West
Supp. 1984-85); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-26 to -27 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-7-28 (Supp. 1983).
8. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-31-1 (1972). This pre-local option provision completely banning all liquor ad-
vertising in the state was repealed to the extent of conflict by the Local Option Alcoholic Beverage Control
Law. Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1 to -97 (1972).
9. Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-37 (1972), which states:
The state tax commission, under its duties and powers with respect to the alcoholic beverage control
division therein, shall have the following powers, functions and duties ... [t~o issue rules prohibiting
the advertising of alcoholic beverages in the state in any class of media and to provide further that
all advertising of the retail price of alcoholic beverages shall be prohibited except on placards or signs
in the interior of licensed premises which are not visible from the exterior.
10. Miss. St. Liquor Control Board Reg. No. 6 (1972) (amended 1985).
No person, firm or corporation shall originate advertisement in this State dealing with alcoholic bever-
ages by any means whatsoever, including but not limited to newspapers, radio, television, circular,
dodger, word-of-mouth, signs, billboards, displays or any other advertising media, except as follows:
1. On the front of any licensed retail package store building, and no higher than the top of the roof
of the permitted place of business at its highest point, there may be printed without illumination, in
letters not more than eight (8) inches high, the name of the business, the permit number thereof, which
may be preceded by the words "A.B.C. Permit No. -_ ", and the words "Package Liquor Sold Here".
Where the package retail store is located in a building of more than one story in height, the top of
such sign shall not be higher than the top of the first story.
2. A package retail store may advertise alcoholic beverages inside the permitted place of business
by means of a display or displays, signs or placards, retailer advertising specialties, or notices, without
special illumination, and pursuant to Regulation No. 32. Such advertisements, whether furnished by
the permittee or by a manufacturer, wholesaler, distiller or other person, pursuant to Regulation No.
32, shall not be removed from the inside of the building housing the permit except for return to the
owner or for destruction. No displays, signs, placards, or notices will be permitted in windows, nor
shall any displays, signs, placards, notices, shelves, counters or other fixtures be constructed or ar-
ranged in such a manner as to attract attention from outside the building.
3. An on-premises retailer permittee may advertise alcoholic beverages ON the permitted place of
business by means of a display or displays, signs or placards, retailer advertising specialties, or no-
tices, pursuant to Regulation No. 32. Such advertisements, whether furnished by the permittee or by
a manufacturer, wholesaler, distiller or other person, MUST be arranged, constructed and/or placed
in a manner to limit visibility of the advertisement to the retailer's premises. Furthermore, no such
advertisements shall be removed from the premises except for return to the owner or for destruction.
4. In any advertising capable of being seen or heard BEYOND the premises, an on-premises retailer
may use the word "lounge" or other similar words descriptive of the facilities, in letters not more than
eight (8) inches high, without special illumination and without referring specifically to alcoholic beverages
which includes but is not limited to distilled spirits, wine, or mixed drinks. Any use of a picture, sym-
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originate within the state. Also, the advertising of alcoholic
beverages "by means of signs, billboards, or displays" along streets
or on buildings is specifically prohibited by state statute. 1"
However, beer and wine containing not more than four per cent
alcohol by weight are not considered "alcoholic beverages" "2 and
are therefore not within the ban. The result is a complete ban of
hard liquor advertising by intrastate media. Local newspapers and
radio and television stations operating from within the state are
affected by the restrictions, but since the laws operate only to
restrict intrastate advertising, liquor advertisements from other
states do reach Mississippi residents as do advertisements in
newspapers and magazines printed or mailed from other states
and sold on newsstands within the state. Also, Regulation No.
6 does permit retail package stores to advertise inside the premises
and to display a sign on the front of the building with the words
"Package-Liquor Sold Here." 
13
bol, logo or other visual representation of the sale of alcoholic beverages is prohibited. Furthermore,
any advertisement making any reference to an alcoholic beverage, or a discount thereon, or the bar
from which alcoholic beverages are sold, is strictly prohibited, including but not limited to "Happy
Hour," "Ladies' Night," "Drink or Drinkery," "All Drinks Half Price," "Cocktail Hour," "Attitude Ad-
justment," "Two-For-One," "Special Prices for Ladies," "Spirits," "Cheers,* etc.
5. All alcoholic beverage advertising not specifically permitted by statute or regulation is prohibit-
ed. Any advertising about which a person is in doubt should be submitted to the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Division of the Mississippi State Tax Commission for PRIOR approval.
11. Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-85 (Supp. 1984). This section provides:
No holder of a package retailer's permit shall have any sign, lighted or otherwise, or printing upon
the outside of the premises covered by his permit advertising, announcing or advising of the sale of
alcoholic beverages in or on said premises. However, on the front of said premises there may be print-
ed, in letters not more than eight (8) inches high, the name of the business, the permit number thereof,
which may be preceded by the words "A.B.C. Permit No." and the words "Package Liquors Sold Here."
In addition, no alcoholic beverages, price list or promotional matter shall be kept, stored or displayed
in the windows or other openings of said premises. An open window space or spaces not exceeding
sixty (60) square feet in area in the aggregate, and an open space of not exceeding twenty (20) square
feet in a front door, may be left open to view. The commission shall have the power and authority
to adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations to compel compliance with the provisions of
this section.
It shall be unlawful to advertise alcoholic beverages by means of signs, billboards, or displays on
or along any road, highway, street, or building; however, native wineries as defined by § 67-l-5(q)
and licensed and operated in accordance with § 67-5-1 et seq. shall have the right to advertise the
sale of native wines as defined in § 67-5-5(a), but such advertising shall not contain any reference
to the price at which such wines shall be sold.
This section shall be construed so as to prohibit the commission from promulgating rules and regula-
tions permitting the holder of an on-premises retailer's permit to include in signs located on the holder's
premises and in advertisements of the holder's principal business, the word "lounge" or other similar
words descriptive of the facilities available at such principal place of business, without referring spe-
cifically to alcoholic beverages.
12. Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-5(a) (1972). This statute states:
The words "alcoholic beverage" mean any alcoholic liquid, including wines of more than four precent
(4%) of alcohol be [sic] weight, capable of being consumed as a beverage by a human being, but shall
not include wine containing four percent (4%) or less of alcohol by weight and shall not include beer
containing not more than four percent (4%) of alcohol by weight ... but shall include native wines.
The words "alcoholic beverage" shall not include ethyl alcohol manufactured or distilled solely for
fuel purposes.
13. See supra note 10.
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Dunagin v. City of Oxford" and Lamar Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission"5 attacked the Mississippi
restrictions principally as a violation of first amendment freedom
of speech but also as a denial of equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment. Opposite judgments were reached by the courts
in those decisions, the Northern District Court in Dunagin
upholding the ban,' and the Southern District Court invalidating
it.' The Southern District relied on the four-prong test in Cen-
tral Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York18 as the test to be utilized in commercial
speech questions to determine the validity of the regulations in
light of the first amendment. "
Dunagin and Lamar Outdoor Advertising were consolidated"
on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit and heard by a panel of the court. The panel applied the Cen-
tral Hudson test in concluding that Mississippi's restrictions on
liquor advertising were an unconstitutional restriction on com-
mercial speech."' Before delivery of the panel opinion, however,
the Tenth Circuit rendered a conflicting opinion"2 upholding an
Oklahoma law23 which was virtually identical to the Mississippi
law being challenged. In accordance with the policy of the Fifth
14. 489 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
15. 539 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Miss. 1982).
16. In Dunagin, the editor and business manager of a college newspaper wished to publish liquor advertise-
ments that would be in violation of the Mississippi law, and in a class-action suit sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief. The court focused on the language in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), where the Court held that the commercial speech doctrine prohibits a
state from suppressing completely "the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful
activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients." 425 U.S. at 773. The
Dunagin court upheld the ban, reasoning that the sale of alcoholic beverages was not an entirely lawful activity
in Mississippi since under the Local Option Law, MIss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1 (1972), such sale was illegal
in almost half of the counties in the state. The court found that the state could actually ban these advertisements
in wet counties, even though they may be protected there since they would promote illegal activity in dry coun-
ties through encouraging student readers of the college newspaper who lived in dry counties to transport liquor
to their homes in those counties. 489 F. Supp. at 771.
17. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 539 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Miss.
1982).
18. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
19. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 539 F. Supp. at 826. For a general discussion see also Comment, Alcohol-
ic Beverage Advertising and the First Amendment, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 861 (1983).
20. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 701 F.2d 314 (1983) (consolidated opinion).
21. Id. at 332.
22. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), revd, Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
23. OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5 (repealed Sept. 18, 1984). "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm
or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverages within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at
the retail outlet bearing the words, 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store.'" An Oklahoma statute similarly prohibits
the advertising of alcoholic beverages within the State of Oklahoma except by strictly regulated signs on the
premises. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (West Supp. 1984-85). Section 506(2) defines "alcoholic beverage"
as "alcohol, spirits, beer, and wine . . . ." However, § 506(3) defines beer as beverages containing more than
3.2% alcohol by weight, thus, since some beer contains less than 3.2 % alcohol, such advertisement is general-
ly allowed. See supra note 12.
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Circuit which applies to the issuance of conflicting opinions as
between circuits, a rehearing en banc was decided by poll and
the panel opinion was vacated, though published.2" The Fifth Cir-
cuit en banc, "5 in rendering its opinion in accordance with the Tenth
Circuit's holding, found that Mississippi's restrictions on liquor
advertising were constitutional in light of the first amendment.
Both the Tenth Circuit" and the Fifth Circuit en banc"7 relied on
the Central Hudson test28 in upholding the constitutionality of the
restrictions.
It is the purpose of this note to explore the basis of the conflict-
ing opinions in determining the validity of restrictions on liquor
advertising: the application of the Central Hudson test. It is thus
appropriate to review Central Hudson.
CENTRAL HUDSON - THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH TEST
The appellant in Central Hudson, an electrical utility holding
a monopoly over the sale of electricity in its area of service, op-
posed, on first amendment grounds, a ban imposed by the Public
Service Commission of New York that ordered all advertising
promoting the use of electricity to cease. The Court held that
although commercial speech is granted lesser constitutional pro-
tection than other expression, it is nevertheless protected from
governmental regulation by the first amendment." In determin-
ing whether such speech is deserving of protection, the Court ar-
ticulated a four-prong test. First, the speech must concern lawful
activity and must not be misleading; second, the state must assert
a substantial interest in restricting the speech; third, the restric-
tion must directly advance the asserted state interest in the res-
triction; and fourth, the regulation must employ the least restrictive
means, that is, the regulation must be no more extensive than
necessary to promote the state's goal."
In applying the test to the facts in Central Hudson, the court
found first, that the expression at issue concerned lawful activity
and was not misleading;3 second, that the state's interest in restrict-
ing the speech so as to curtail the use of electricity was substan-
tial;3" third, that the state's interest in conserving energy was
24. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 316, see asterisk.
25. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission. 718 F.2d 738 (1983).
26. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 499-502.
27. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 718 F.2d at 746-53.
28. 447 U.S. at 566.
29. Id. at 571.
30. Id. at 566.
31. Id. at 566-68.
32. Id. at 568-69.
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directly advanced by the state's regulation;33 and fourth, that the
regulation was more extensive than necessary to promote the state's
interest in conserving energy since it was not shown that a more
limited regulation on the basis of content would not adequately
serve the state's interests.34 The restriction, therefore, was held
invalid as a violation of first amendment freedom of speech.3"
THE PROBLEM
The conflict emerges with the application of the third prong
of the test. This aspect of the test requires that the restriction on
the speech must directly advance the asserted state interest in the
restriction.36 Specifically, the problem lies in determining the im-
pact of the twenty-first amendment on the allocation of the bur-
den of proof and the appropriate level of review in determining
whether the speech directly advances the asserted state interest.
A review of each court's approach to the problem follows.
APPLICATION OF Central Hudson TEST IN
Lamar Outdoor Advertising
The plaintiffs in Lamar Outdoor Advertising consisted of 56
outdoor print and electronic media advertisers who challenged
the Mississippi ban in the Southern District seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief as a violation of freedom of speech, due
process and equal protection.37 In contrast to the decision rendered
by the Northern District in Dunagin, 8 the ban was held to be in-
valid as a violation of first amendment freedom of speech.39
As to the application of Central Hudson's four-prong test by
the Southern District in Lamar Outdoor Advertising, the court
fQund first, that the expression upon which restrictions are sought
concern lawful activities and are not misleading." Second, the
court presumed the validity of the state's interest in promoting
temperance." However, in applying the third prong, the court
found that the evidence on the issue of whether the ban advanced
the state's interest in temperance did not show that the interest
was actually advanced since its residents were exposed to
numerous alcoholic beverage advertisements originating from out-
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id. at 569-70.
35. Id. at 571.
36. Id. at 564.
37. 539 F. Supp. at 818-19.
38. See supra note 16.
39. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 539 F. Supp. at 830-3 1.
40. Id. at 828. Here, the court reasons that it is the sale or consumption of alcohol that is forbidden under
Mtss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1 (1972), and not the advertisement thereof. Compare this with the analysis in Duna-
gin. See supra note 16.
41. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 539 F. Supp. at 828.
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side the state. 2 The Southern District placed the burden on the
state to prove that its interest was advanced by the regulations."
The ban was invalidated since the state could not meet its burden.
The fourth prong of the test was not addressed.
APPLICATION OF Central Hudson TEST BY THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT PANEL
The panel also applied the four-prong test of Central Hudson
to determine the validity of Mississippi's alcoholic beverage ad-
vertising ban as a regulation of commercial free speech deserv-
ing of first amendment protection. The first prong of the test
requires that the speech not be misleading and that it involve a
lawful activity." The panel, unlike the Northern District in Duna-
gin,"5 rejected the state's argument which focused on the language
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc. ,"6 and which contended that the sale of li-
quor is not an entirely lawful activity within the state since almost
one-half of the state's counties have chosen to remain dry under
the Local Option Law." Instead, the panel interpreted the require-
ment in Virginia State Board that "a state may not completely sup-
press truthful information about an entirely lawful activity" as
referring to the "legality of the transaction proposed. . . not upon
the geographical extent of the advertised product's legal availa-
bility .... ,,,4 The panel was cognizant of the relationship be-
tween advertising originating in counties where liquor is lawfully
sold and the illegal transportation of liquor to other counties but
refused to allow this to support restrictions on the commercial
free speech doctrine. 9 In maintaining that such advertisements
were misleading, the state claimed that the use of liquor would
be portrayed as a discernible activity while the harmful effects
would be ignored."0 The panel refused to uphold the constitution-
ality of a law on the basis of the desirability of the activity, stat-
ing that it would not make value judgments, and suggested that
narrow restrictions on time, place and manner, rather than an over-
all ban on content, could remedy the misleading quality of such
advertisements. 51
42. Id. at 828-29.
43. Id.
44. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 701 F.2d at 320 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566) (consolidated
opinion).
45. See supra note 16.
46. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See supra note 16.
47. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 320. See supra note 5.
48. Id. at 321 (construing Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 748).
49. Id. at 322.
50. Id. at 323-24.
51. Id. at 324.
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The panel readily accepted that the state had a substantive in-
terest in promoting temperance in applying the second prong of
the Central Hudson test. 2 However, the Mississippi law was in-
validated on the basis of the third prong of the test, which re-
quires that the state's interest in promoting temperance be actually
advanced by the restriction. 3 In determining this, the panel first
considered the state's objection to the application of the customary
level of scrutiny to the legislation."4 The state claims that the
enhanced power granted by the twenty-first amendment"5 relaxes
the standard of review in legislation regulating liquor from an
intermediate standard of review as applied in Central Hudson to
a rational basis standard, which is more deferential to the state.5
In concluding that the customary standard of review would apply
to first amendment cases relating to the twenty-first amendment, 7
the panel considered two contradictory lines of cases.
The first line, relied upon by the state, California v. LaRue 8
and New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,9 supported a
rational basis standard of review.6" In LaRue, the plaintiffs
challenged on first amendment grounds a California regulation
which prohibited the performance or display of films of actual
or simulated sexual acts in bars licensed by the California
Alcoholic Beverage Control Department. 1 The Supreme Court
upheld the regulation based upon two factors: an "added presump-
tion of validity" where the twenty-first amendment is concerned
and the "additional power of the state to regulate expression that
is also conduct." 2 Thus, the court applied a "deferential standard
of review" because the state's conclusion that "certain sexual per-
formances and the dispensation of liquor by the drink ought not
to occur at premises that have licenses was not an irrational one." 3
Bellanca upheld a regulation prohibiting topless dancing in bars
and night clubs licensed to serve liquor, thus extending LaRue
beyond acts of "gross sexuality." The panel rejected this line
of cases as authority since the issues portrayed sought to regulate
the conditions and expressive conduct under which liquor would
52. Id. at 331.
53. Id. at 332.
54. Id. at 325.
55. See supra note 1.
56. Id. at 325-26.
57. Id. at 326-29.
58. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
59. 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
60. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 326.
61. California v. Lame, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
62. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 326-27.
63. Id. at 327.
64. Id.
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be sold and the Mississippi law is an overall ban which does not
relate to conditions but is aimed directly at speech and its con-
tent, leaving no alternatives for the origination of such speech
by any in-state media."
Instead, the panel chose to rely on Craig v. Boren," where the
Court held that the twenty-first amendment "primarily created an
exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause" and
its relevance to other constitutional provisions was seen as doubt-
ful.67 In Craig, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute which
prohibited the sale of 3.2 % beer to males under 21 and to females
under 18 was violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 8 The Court in Craig emphasized that when
individual rights are involved, state police powers are to be limited
and that infringements on protected speech will not be tolerated
solely on the basis of enhanced police powers granted pursuant
to the twenty-first amendment." Craig held that the twenty-first
amendment did not defer to the state, thereby altering the stan-
dard of review to a rational basis from that that would otherwise
govern for equal protection.70 Craig distinguished LaRue by sug-
gesting that the level of review was diminished in LaRue only
because there, the twenty-first amendment was coupled with the
"conduct" element of the expression in question. 1 The panel saw
no reason to further distinguish Craig and LaRue on the basis that
LaRue involved the first amendment and Craig the equal protection
clause since both cases involve individual rights assertable against
the states through the fourteenth amendment.7"
The panel also considered the applicability of Queensgate In-
vestment Company v. Liquor Control Commission.73 There, a regu-
lation prohibited permit holders who were licensed to sell liquor
by the drink from referring to price in their advertisements. The
Ohio Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs claim that their com-
mercial speech rights were violated and the appeal was summari-
ly dismissed by the Supreme Court. The panel relied on Mandel
v. Bradley" in determining whether Queensgate would control
the instant case.75 Mandel v. Bradley held that such dismissals
65. Id. at 327-28.
66. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
67. id. at 206.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 207.
70. Id. at 209.
71. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 329.
72. Id.
73. 67 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S 807 (1982).
74. 432 U.S. at 173.
75. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 330.
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are binding only to "the precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions."" The panel therefore concluded that
since the issues in Queensgate differ from those in this case in
that they are narrower in scope, that Queensgate should not be
applied beyond its context.7
The panel, having determined that the level of review would
not defer to the state, that is, that it would follow Craig, then
addressed the third prong of the Central Hudson test.7" This prong
requires that the restriction on commercial speech directly advance
the asserted state interest in the restriction, that is, the state's
restrictions on intrastate liquor advertising must directly advance
the asserted state interest in promoting temperance. The panel,
as did the Southern District, placed this burden on the state."'
Though the panel found that the state failed to meet its burden,"
it never addressed what effect advertising actually had on con-
sumption. However, the panel found that the ban was ineffective
in light of the numerous liquor advertisements inundating
Mississippians from out-of-state sources. 1 The fourth prong of
the test was not confronted. In concluding, the panel stated that
the state may not attempt to manipulate the choices of its citizens
by depriving them of information necessary to make a free
choice, 2 and that public ignorance is an invalid means of advanc-
ing government goals according to the first amendment. 3
FIFTH CIRCUIT EN BANC
In an eight to five opinion, 4 the Fifth Circuit, on rehearing en
banc, upheld the constitutionality of the Mississippi law on the
basis that it violated neither the first amendment nor the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Though the court
hinted that the first amendment may offer no "protection of pure-
ly commercial advertising of products which the state could en-
tirely proscribe," and that a state entitled by virtue of its police
power to prohibit a trade may restrict advertising of that trade
without being required to justify the restriction, it did not so hold."
However, false, deceptive and misleading commercial speech has
76. Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176.
77. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 330.
78. Id. at 331.
79. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 43.
80. Dunagin, 701 F.2d at 331.
81. Id. at 332.
82. Id. at 333 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574-75).
83. Id. (quoting Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 769-70).
84. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Commission 718 F.2d 738 (1983). Judges
dissenting were Goldberg, Gee, Politz, Randall, Higginbotham. Judges in favor of the decision were Clark,
Brown, Reavley, Tate, Johnson, Williams, Garwood and Jolly.
85. Id. at 742.
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been excluded from first amendment protection,86 as has the ad-
vertising of illegal activities."'
The state contended that liquor advertising in Mississippi would
promote illegal activity and would therefore be excluded from
first amendment protection since a substantial number of coun-
ties within the state are "dry" as a result of the Local Option Law."
The court rejected this contention and stressed that "the commer-
cial speech doctrine would disappear if its protection ceased
whenever the advertised product might be used illegally."" The
state also argued that liquor advertisements are beyond protec-
tion because they are misleading in associating alcohol with "the
good life" while ignoring its threats. The court also rejected this
argument, reasoning that since most advertising promotes prod-
ucts with a positive lifestyle, ' the first amendment presumes that
some accurate information is better than no information at all. 1
In support of this rationale, the court cited Bolger v. Youngs Drugs
Products Corporation"2 as authority, which stated that "the govern-
ment may not reduce the adult population . . . to reading only
what is fit for children!" '
The court then addressed the question of whether the power
granted to the states via the twenty-first amendment to regulate
alcohol superseded first amendment claims against a state regula-
tion which banned liquor advertising." The court, though recogniz-
ing that Section 2 of the twenty-first amendment" primarily creates
an exception to the normal operation of the commerce clause, 6
held that its effect is much broader, contrary to the reasoning of
the panel in following Craig v. Boren."7 In researching the
legislative history of the twenty-first amendment, the court con-
cluded that since a third section "8 was originally proposed to the
twenty-first amendment that was deleted because it might have
been interpreted in support of federal supremacy in the regula-
tion of the sale of liquor, the validity of a state regulation of li-
86. Id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566).
87. Id. (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89
(1973)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 743.
90. id.
91. id. (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562).
92. 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983).
93. Id.
94. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 718 F.2d at 743.
95. See supra note I.
96. 718 F.2d at 743 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
98. 76 CONG. REC. 4138 (1933). "Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale
of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold."
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quor would not be tested in the traditional manner in determining
its constitutionality; instead, state power would be presumed where
intoxicating liquors are concerned.99
The en banc court, like the panel, also addressed LaRue and
Bellanca.'0o Unlike the panel, however, the en banc court relied
on these cases as authority and did not distinguish them on the
basis that the issues portrayed sought to regulate the conditions
and expressive conduct under which liquor would be sold and were
thus not aimed directly at speech and its content as is the Mississip-
pi restriction."'o The court en banc reiterated that the twenty-first
amendment gives state legislatures not the courts, the right to make
policy judgments." ' Thus, the court held that LaRue and Bellan-
ca constitutionally restrict fully protected speech "because the
restriction was incidental to the rational regulation of liquor." The
standard of scrutiny is relaxed from that applied in Central Hud-
son to a rational basis level. Also, since LaRue and Bellanca
employ a presumption in favor of the validity of the restriction,
the court placed the burden of proof on the party attacking the
legislation, thus relieving the state."0 3
The state argued that Queensgate is binding as precedent."' The
court rejected this argument, stating that the Queensgate regula-
tion only banned certain price advertising and is actually a "time,
place, and manner" restriction, unlike the overall Mississippi ban
on all intrastate advertising."10
The court's decision was ultimately based on the application of
the four-prong test of Central Hudson for commercial free speech
cases. The test was reaffirmed as authority in the United States
Supreme Court's most recent commercial speech case, Bolger v.
Youngs Drugs Products Corporation"6 The en banc court read-
ing found that the first two prongs of the test were met.' 7 However,
the difficulty begins with the application of the third prong. In
determining whether the restriction actually advances the state's
interest in promoting temperance, the court rejected the plaintiffs
contention that advertising merely reallocates the market share
among brands rather than increasing consumption. Otherwise, the
court reasoned, the liquor industry would not spend such huge
99. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 718 F.2d at 744.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
101. 718 F.2d at 745.
102. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 43 and 79.
103. 718 F.2d at 745.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
105. 718 F.2d at 746.
106. 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983).
107. 718 F.2d at 747.
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sums of money for the promotion of liquor sales simply "to ac-
quire an added market share at the expense of competitors." The
court concluded that advertising and consumption are linked
regardless of whether "concrete scientific evidence" exists in sup-
port; therefore, the state's interest in promoting temperance is ad-
vanced by the regulation. The court reiterated the added
presumption of the validity of such regulations as required by
LaRue, Bellanca, and Queensgate in support of the link between
advertising and consumption." The plaintiffs contention that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate level of review was rejected since "the
right to advertise for profits" is not a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the Constitution. 9 In applying equal protection to the
plaintiffs classification, the court stated that the commercial speech
doctrine recognizes no such classification since it is primarily con-
cerned with the quality of information reaching the listener. ° As
to the fourth prong of the test, whether the regulation employs
the least restrictive means toward the end, given again the added
presumption in favor of validity in liquor-related legislation, the
ban was upheld on the rationale that any advertising at all would
promote consumption, therefore the restriction was not more ex-
tensive than necessary. 1'
THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, cable operators in Cablecom-General, Inc. v. Crisp1 "
and telecasters in Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp'3
filed separate suits against Crisp in his official capacity as Direc-
tor of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, seeking declaratory
judgments that Oklahoma's prohibition1 . on the advertisement of
alcoholic beverages violated first amendment rights to free speech
and fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection. As a result
of these restrictions, Oklahoma telecasters who rebroadcast net-
work programming that includes advertisements for wine, are re-
quired to "block out" these advertisements. Pursuant to an opinion
issued by the Attorney General of Oklahoma on May 19, 1980,
declaring that "the prohibitions against alcoholic beverage adver-
108. Id. at 750.
109. Id. at 752.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 751.
112. Cablecom-General, Inc. v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-290-W (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (nunc pro tunc
opinion), revd sub nom. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
113. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-439-W (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (nuncpro tunc
opinion), revd, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 66 (1984).
114. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (1982).
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tising apply to cable television ...as they apply to broadcast
television," cable operators were notified that wine commercials
were not to be relayed,11 despite federal copyright law and Fed-
eral Communication Commission regulations which prohibit ca-
ble operators from altering signals relayed to subscribers.' 16 The
district court filed nearly identical opinions in the two cases.. and
granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. It held that
the state's power to regulate liquor under the twenty-first amend-
ment did not supersede the plaintiffs first amendment rights. The
district court applied the Central Hudson test and concluded that
the state failed to carry its burden in proving the third part of the
test, that the restriction on liquor advertising directly advanced
its interest in reducing consumption. The court also found that
the state did not show, as required by part four of the test, that
an absolute ban was not more extensive than necessary to serve
its interest." 8
The state appealed both cases to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the cases were consolidated.119
The court upheld Oklahoma's regulations, holding that a state may
suppress virtually all advertising of alcoholic beverages originat-
ing from within the state. 2 '
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit en banc opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit found the issue in Queensgate... to be substantially similar
to that in the instant case. Though the court recognized the fac-
tual distinctions in the cases, it focused on what it considered to
be the crucial similarity between the two: that the state, through
the twenty-first amendment, has prohibited some, but not all forms
of liquor advertising with the goal of decreasing consumption.
The main distinction the court made between Queensgate and the
instant case is that the laws in this case "prohibit the rebroadcast-
ing of all advertising of alcoholic beverages, except for beer ad-
vertising," while Queensgate restricted only off-premises price
advertising of liquor sold by the drink. The Tenth Circuit found
the Queensgate dismissal to be binding."
In balancing the right to commercial free speech of the
115. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n, 699 F.2d at 492.
116. Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § II I(c)(3) (1976), 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1981).
117. Cablecom-General, Inc. v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-290-W (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (nunc pro tunc
opinion), rev'd sub nom. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983); Oklahoma
Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, No. Civ. 81-439-W (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 1982) (nunc pro tunc opinion), rev'd,
699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. granted 104 S. Ct. 66 (1984).
118. See supra text accompanying note 31.
119. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 502.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77 and 104-05.
122. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 497.
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telecasters and cable operators against the right of the state through
its police powers granted by the twenty-first amendment, the Tenth
Circuit held on two separate grounds that Oklahoma's laws were
within the scope granted by the twenty-first amendment and are
therefore entitled to the "added presumption in favor of validi-
ty." 12 Determinative of this result is the reasoning that advertis-
ing is incidental to the sale of liquor, which is regulated by the
state, and that a state has broad discretion over the laws through
which it has chosen to best protect its residents from the harms
associated with alcoholic consumption."'
In determining that Oklahoma's restrictions are deserving of first
amendment protection,' the Tenth Circuit relied on the Central
Hudson26 test. In its application of the test, the court relied on
Craig v. Boren'27 in finding that the twenty-first amendment does
not alter the standards that would otherwise apply to equal pro-
tection cases.2 8 Thus strict scrutiny would apply. However, in
the actual application of the third part of the test, the court held
as a matter of law that prohibitions against the advertising of al-
coholic beverages advanced the state's interest in reducing con-
sumption. 29 The court concluded this in light of the additional
deference owed to the state through the twenty-first amendment.
It also relied on Bellanca3 ° and Metromedia Inc. v. City of San
Diego.' In addressing the fourth and final part of the test, the
least restrictive means, the court found that Oklahoma had not
completely eliminated the dissemination of information pertain-
ing to liquor since on-premises sign advertising is allowed and
beer advertising is permitted. Thus the prohibitions were found
to be no more extensive than necessary to serve the state's in-
terest. '
The cable operators appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court.' The Court held that Oklahoma's alcoholic
beverage advertising restrictions as applied to out-of-state signals
carried by cable operators within Oklahoma are pre-empted by
123. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 498 (citing New York State Liquor Authority
v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981)).
124. 699 F.2d at 498.
125. Id. at 502.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
128. 699 F.2d at 499.
129. Id. at 501.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64 and 100-03.
131. 453 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981). In Metromedia, a plurality agreed as a matter of law that an ordinance
eliminating billboards was reasonably related to traffic safety though there was nothing in the record to show
any connection between billboards and traffic safety.
132. 699 F.2d at 502.
133. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
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federal law notwithstanding the twenty-first amendment." Though
the court acknowledged that it is possible for cable systems to
comply with Oklahoma's restrictions by abandoning their impor-
tation of distant broadcast signals, it found that such a loss of view-
ing options would stifle the policy supported by Congress and the
Federal Communications Commission of encouraging the impor-
tation of distant broadcast signals.3S The court measured the limit-
ed state interest in promoting temperance actually furthered by
the ban at issue, which is directed only at wine commercials that
occasionally appear on out-of-state signals carried by cable oper-
ators,'36 against the significant interferance with the federal ob-
jective of insuring widespread availability of diverse cable services
throughout the country, and found the balance to tip decisively
in favor of federal law. Thus, enforcement of the statute was barred
by the supremacy clause.137 However, the court did not consider
whether the first amendment question as to the ban constituted
an invalid restriction on protected speech.'38
ANALYSIS
It is apparent that the Central Hudson test is the test to be ap-
plied for commercial speech cases. The Tenth Circuit, as well
as both Fifth Circuit opinions, basically agree in the application
of the first two parts of the test. Both courts agree that 1) the sale
of alcoholic beverages, though regulated, is a lawful activity and
that such advertising is not inherently misleading, and that 2) a
state has a substantial interest in regulating alcoholic consump-
tion in light of its effect on the health and welfare of its citizens.139
The conflict emerges with the application of part three of the
test: whether the state's restriction on such speech directly ad-
vances the state's interest in promoting temperance. This is dif-
ficult to prove, therefore, it is important to determine which party
has the burden. The Southern District Court and the Fifth Circuit
panel held that the ban did not advance temperance in light of
the fact that Mississippi residents are exposed to so much liquor
advertising originating from outside the state.'° Both courts placed
the burden on the state. The panel acknowledged that Central Hud-
son requires a close relationship between legislative means and
134. Id. at 2707-09.
135. Id. at 2707-08.
136. Id. at 2709.
137. Id.
138. Id. See also supra note 16.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52. 89-93. and 118.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43 and 53-81.
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ends, thus calling for a heightened scrutiny.' However, the court
en banc disagreed. It not only concluded that a rational basis review
was appropriate but also shifted the burden of proof to the media
advertisers by granting an added presumption of validity to legis-
lative regulations as required by its application of LaRue, Bel-
lanca, and Queensgate. 1 2 The ban was justified on the basis that
advertising and consumption are linked whether or not concrete
scientific evidence exists on the point.' The Tenth Circuit reduced
the level of scrutiny, but required the state to bear the burden;
nevertheless, it concluded, as a matter of law, that advertising
is related to consumption." ' The result is therefore the same as
that reached by the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit panel did not confront the fourth part of the
test -the least restrictive means."' The en banc opinion held that
a lesser restriction based on time, place, and manner would be
ineffective since the state's concern is not lack of public awareness
of the dangers of alcoholic consumption, but that advertising would
promote consumption despite known harms.' The Tenth Circuit
found that the restriction was no broader than necessary to pro-
mote the state's interest since some on-site advertising was per-
mitted.47
CONCLUSION
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit upheld the state's
respective bans. Though the Tenth Circuit, relying on Queensgate
and Bellanca, upheld the ban by deferring to the state and holding
as a matter of law that consumption and advertising are related,
it did not shift the burden from the state in determining part three
of the Central Hudson test as did the Fifth Circuit en banc. The
en banc court relied on Bellanca and LaRue to employ a presump-
tion in favor of the validity of the restriction which thereby relieved
the state of its burden. Both circuits, however, arrived at the same
result. Though Bellanca and LaRue are easily distinguished from
the instant case in that their restrictions are limited as to "time,
place, and manner" whereas the regulation at hand is virtually
an absolute ban on commercial speech originating from within
the state, as acknowledged in the panel opinion, the Fifth and Tenth
141. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
142. See supra text accompanying note 103.
143. See supra text accompanying note 108.
144. See supra text accompanying note 118.
145. See supra text accompanying note 82.
146. See supra text accompanying note Ill.
147. See supra text accompanying note 132.
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Circuits failed to give credibility to this distinction. Nor did either
court chose to distinguish LaRue and Bellanca from the instant
case on the basis that the restrictions in those cases applied to con-
duct proscribed in establishments licensed to sell liquor where
greater discretion under the twenty-first amendment would be ex-
pected. Thus, both circuits concluded that the twenty-first amend-
ment permits the regulation of commercial speech by the state
that might not be otherwise permitted through the application of
the Central Hudson test.
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